In a tree enterprise, users reside at the nodes of the tree and their aim is to connect themselves, directly or indirectly, to the root of the tree. The construction costs of arcs of the tree are given by means of the arc-cost-function associated with the tree. Further the bankruptcy venture is described in terms of the estate of the bankrupt firm and the claims of the various creditors. The first objective of the paper is to provide conditions (on the claims and the surplus of the claims in the bankruptcy venture) which are sufficient and necessary for the bankruptcy venture to agree with some tree enterprise. It is established that the bankruptcy venture agrees with some tree enterprise if and only if the surplus of claims in the bankruptcy venture is at most the size of the second smallest claim (in the weak sense). For that purpose, both the tree enterprise as well as the bankruptcy venture are modelled as a cooperative game with transferable utility. Within the framework of cooperative game theory, the proof of the equivalence theorem concerning the tree enterprise game and the bankruptcy game, under the given circumstances, is based on graph-theoretic tools in a tree structure. As an adjunct to the proof of the equivalence theorem, the solution concept of the nucleolus for specific tree enterprises is determined.
The standard tree enterprise in comparison with the bankruptcy venture:
game-theoretic models Let (V,E) be a directed graph with node set V and arc set E, which is provided with a (nonnegative)
arc-cost-function a : E + R+. The graph can be regarded as the mathematical model of a cable-television network in which one central supplier (the central station broadcasting cable-television signals) is located at a distinguished node (denoted by 0) and the users in the remaining nodes so that every user resides at exactly one node. The aim of the users is to connect themselves, directly or indirectly, to the central supplier by constructing connecting-links (i.e., arcs of the graph) through which the cable-television signals are transmitted. The construction costs of connecting-links are given by means of the arc-cost-function associated with the graph. Throughout this paper it is supposed that the users in the network are connected to the central supplier through a standard tree enterprise. We say the directed graph is a standard tree enterprise if, for each vertex, there is a unique path from the distinguished node 0, called the root of the tree, to that vertex. All arcs are directed away from the root of the tree and the construction of arcs not in the tree is regarded infeasible (or too costly).
In the game-theoretic literature the former standard tree enterprise has been modelled as a cooperative cost game (N,c). The player set N represents the set of users in the cable-television network (i.e., nodes of the standard tree enterprise different from the root) and the cost function ~:2~ + R is defined so that, for each coalition S c N, the cost c(S) equals the least cost to connect all users in S to the central supplier 0 via arcs of the standard tree enterprise.
(1.1)
The so-called standard tree enterprise game (N, c) of (1.1) was discussed in [9-111.
The game-theoretic analysis of the standard tree enterprise deals with the cost allocation problem of setting charges to the users in order to allocate the overall cost c(N). How to allocate the least total construction costs of connecting-links to the users in the network?
In addition to the cost allocation problem in a standard tree enterprise, we address the division problem how to divide the estate of a bankrupt firm among various creditors.
The problem is that the claims of the creditors are mutually inconsistent in that the estate is insufficient to meet all of the claims. In the game-theoretic literature the latter bankruptcy venture has been modelled as a cooperative savings game (N, u). where E denotes the estate of the bankrupt firm and di the claim of creditor i, i E N. It is always supposed that the estate E satisfies 0 <E 6 CjEN dj (otherwise, the bankruptcy problem would not exist). The so-called bankruptcy game (N, u) of (1.2) was introduced in [12] and is studied in [2-81. Notice that the game model of the standard tree enterprise is formulated in terms of cost figures, whereas the game model of the bankruptcy venture is in terms of savings. In order to be able to compare both game models, there is associated with the given cost function ~:2~ + R of (1.1) the cost savings function W: 2N + R defined by w(S) := CjEs c<(j)) -c(S) for all S c N. Here the worth w(S) represents the cost savings that would result from cooperation between the members of S instead of acting alone. Clearly, individuals earn no cost savings, i.e., w({i}) =0
for all i E N. Generally speaking, the bankruptcy game (N, U) of ( 1.2) fails to be a zero-normalized game, i.e., u( {i}) = 0 for all i E N. Throughout the remainder of the paper, we replace the bankruptcy game (N,u) by its zero-normalized version (N,v) defined by f_(S) := u(S) -1 u( {j}) for all S c N, jtS or equivalently,
Here the nonnegative surplus of cluims defined by A := CjEN d, -E represents the part of the claims that cannot be met by the estate.
The (first) main goal of the paper is to establish that, under certain circumstances, the bankruptcy division problem can be treated as an equivalent of the cost allocation problem in some standard tree enterprise. In terminology of the corresponding game models, it will be proved in Section 2 that, under certain conditions on the estate and the claims, the zero-normalized bankruptcy game agrees with the cost savings game arising from some standard tree enterprise game. Thus, given the game (N, u) of (1.3), we look for a standard tree enterprise game (N, c) of (1.1) satisfying v(S) := CjEs c({ j})-c(S) for all S c N. The main results of Section 2 are stated in Theorems 2.1 and 2.3.
The solution part of cooperative game theory deals with the study of all kinds of solution concepts, such as the core, stable sets, bargaining set, (pre)kemel, nucleolus, Shapley value and r-value (cf. [5] ). In the context of the bankruptcy game (N,u) of (1.2), almost all solution concepts are well studied and determined in an appropriate manner (cf. [2, 3, 5, 12] ), whereas, in the setting of the standard tree enterprise game (N, c) of (1.1 ), one has to go to a lot of trouble to determine the above solution concepts, especially the nucleolus (cf. [lo] ).
As an adjunct to the forthcoming proof of Theorem 2.3, Section 3 deals with the concept of the nucleolus for the specific standard tree enterprises which we shall encounter within the proof of Theorem 2.3. The (second) main goal of the paper is to exploit the equivalence between bankruptcy ventures and standard tree enterprises in the sense that we first discuss the elegant description of the nucleolus for those specific bankruptcy ventures (taken from the development of the nucleolus for general bankruptcy ventures) and next we transfer the obtained result for the nucleolus from the bankruptcy venture to the underlying standard tree enterprise by means of a simple relationship between cost and savings allocations. this game is symmetric, that is the cost savings merely depend on the number of users in coalition S and not the users themselves.
given by
=4(O,i1))+4(i1, i2)) and w({il,i2,i3})=2a((O,i1 >>+a((il, &I).
Notice that in this situation the users i2 and i3 are substitutes. 
The representation of bankruptcy ventures as standard tree enterprises
In this section we are concerned with the possible representation of the zeronormalized bankruptcy game as the cost savings game arising from a standard tree enterprise game. That is, we aim to provide conditions (on the claims and the surplus of claims in the bankruptcy venture) which are sufficient and necessary for the cost savings relationship between zero-normalized bankruptcy games and standard tree enterprise games.
Let N = { 1,2,. . , n} be the set of creditors. Given the claims d,, i EN, of the creditors, we may order these claims, without loss of generality, so that 0 < d, < dZ 6 .
The number of members of coalition S is denoted by ISI. In view of Remark 1.1, we assume throughout this section that there are at least three creditors, so n 3 3. Although the cost c(S) of any coalition S containing user n (i.e., the unique leaf of the chain) will be increased by the size of a((n -1, n)), the corresponding cost savings game does not change. N(') ). Therefore, the overall cost savings for the grand coalition N in r are attainable as the sum of the overall cost savings in the various subtrees r(') on node sets NC') U {0}, 1 </ 6 p. Our objective is to study the possible decomposition of r into various subtrees and next, to determine the overall cost savings in each subtree of r.
For the moment let us concentrate on one subtree r(r), rooted at node 0, of r. Let node il EN (l) be the unique follower of node 0 in r(l), that is r(l) contains the arc (0, it). In case node il has no followers in r(l) (that is, r(l) contains exactly one arc), then the subtree r(l) generates no cost savings. Without loss of generality we may suppose that node il has at least one follower, say node i2 EN('), in r(l), so the arc (il, i2) belongs to r (I) The cost savings for the coalition {il, i2) in r(l) can be . determined in two ways: on the one hand, c({il})+c({i2})-c({il,i2})=a((O,il) 
Consider an arbitrary third node i3 EN (I) in r(' ' (which node is always connected, directly or indirectly, with node il). The previous reasoning applies once again (replace i2 by i3) to conclude that
As a consequence of (2.2) and (2.3), we obtain that 
>O).
We conclude that the underlying standard tree enterprise r contains exactly one nontrivial subtree rooted at node 0 (so, we ignore the trivial subtrees, rooted at node 0, of r consisting of one arc). Let node il t N be the unique follower of node 0 in r and let node i2 EN be some follower of node ii in r. Subcase 1: Suppose that each node jE N\{ } n 1s a follower of node n, so all arcs of the form (n,j), jcN\{n}, belong to r. The cost savings for the coalition N\(n) in r can be determined in two ways: on the one hand, C,jEN,In) c<(j)) -c(N\{n})= (n -2)a((O,n))=(n -2)d, >0 and on the other, by using (
Since the cost savings are strictly positive, the induced equality , iz) ) and on the other, by using (1. In both subcases we arrive at d, = A which result contradicts the assumption that A >d2 >d,. We conclude that A 6 d2. This completes the first case.
({n})+c({i~})+c({i4))-({ c n,h,i~})=2a((O,n))+a((n,i2))=2d, + a((n
Case 2: Suppose that node i, has exactly one follower, namely node i2 EN, in r. Consider some follower i3 EN of node i2 in r, so the arc (i2, i3) also belongs to r. The cost savings for the coalition {i,,iz,ij} in r can be determined in two ways: on the one hand, c({ii}) + ~( (4) We distinguish two subcases.
Subcase 1: Suppose that node i2 has at least two followers, say nodes i3, id EN, in r, so both arcs (i2, i3) and (i2, i4) belong to r. The cost savings for the coalition {i2,is,i4} in r can be determined in two ways: on the one hand, c({iz}) + c Subcase 2: Suppose that node i2 has exactly one follower, say node i3 EN, in r. In case node i3 has at least two followers in r, it can be shown that the arc (iz, i3) is costless as well as di: 3 A. In a more general setting, consider a chain enterprise consisting of the arcs (&_I, ik), 1 <k < t, in r, where io := 0, so that node it has at least two followers, say nodes it+l, it+2 EN, and the arcs (i&l, ik ), 3 < k 6 t -1, are costless. The cost savings for the coalition {ik 1 1 d k < t + l} in r can be determined in two ways: on the one hand, a((0, il)) + (t -l)min[d;,, A] + a((ii_l,i,) ) and on the other, by using (1. Involving the bankruptcy venture with the three different claims dl = 100, d2 = 150, d3 = 175 (see Example 1.5), the surplus of claims A equals 425 -E and thus, d2 3 A iff E 3275. Particularly, by Corollary 2.4, the bankruptcy venture corresponding to the estate E = 250 cannot be associated with any standard tree enterprise on node set {0,1,2,3} ( w tc result was already shown by means of Example 1.4). h' h Remark 2.6. Let us compare the current results with the results obtained by Driessen [6] who studied the interrelationship between bankruptcy games and minimum cost spanning tree games.
((i3)) + c((i4)) -c({i2,&, id}) = 2a((O, i,)) + 2a((i,,iz))
In the context of the spanning tree enterprise, the player set N represents the set of users in the cable-television network (i.e., nodes of the complete graph which is provided with a nonnegative arc-cost-function) and the cost function c: 2N -+ R is defined so that, for each coalition S c N, the cost figure c(S) equals the least cost to connect all users in S to the central supplier 0 via arcs of a spanning tree on node set S U (0). This type of a game is well-known as a minimum cost spanning tree game.
Driessen [6] established that the zero-normalized n-person bankruptcy game (N, v) of (1.3) can be represented as the cost savings game arising from a minimum cost spanning tree game with user set N if and only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied:
l The surplus of claims A in the bankruptcy venture is at most the size of the third smallest claim (in the weak sense, i.e., 0 6 A 6 C& )
l There exists a unique natural number k E {3,4,. . . , n -l} such that dk <A 6 dk+] and C:=, dt 6 A. Consequently, bankruptcy ventures that can be associated with some standard tree enterprise, can also be associated with some spanning tree enterprise (since A < d2 implies A < d3). However, the bankruptcy venture with the three different claims dl = 100, d2 = 150, dj = 175 (see Example 1.5) and the variable estate E satisfying 250 6 E ~275, cannot be associated with any standard tree enterprise, but it can still be associated with some spanning tree enterprise on node set (0, 1,2,3}. For instance, consider the zero-normalized three-person bankruptcy game (N, v) in case E = 250 (see Example 1.5). It appears that the game (N, v) can be associated with the spanning tree enterprise on node set (0, 1,2,3} of which the arc-cost-function a is given by
Indeed, the cost savings game arising from the corresponding minimum cost spanning tree game equals the game (N,v). For further properties in the context of bankruptcy games and minimum cost spanning tree games, see [ 1, 61.
An application: the case of the nucleolus for a standard tree enterprise
In order to exploit the equivalence between bankruptcy ventures and standard tree enterprises, let us determine the nucleolus for the specific standard tree enterprises which we encountered within the proof of Theorem 2.3.
Let node 1 EN be the unique follower of node 0 in the standard tree enterprise r and let node 2 EN be some follower of node 1 in r (assuming that n > 3 and r has no trivial subtrees, rooted at node 0, consisting of one arc). So, both arcs (0,l) and (1,2) belong to I', where a((0, 1)) >O. We distinguish two possibilities for the structure of the standard tree enterprise. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: Suppose that the estate is significant, i.e., E 2 xjEN dj -indl, or equivalently, (n -2)u((O, 1)) 3 2u (( 1,2) That is, according to the nucleolus concept, the least total costs c(N) is allocated in such a way that each leaf in the standard tree enterprise is charged its separable cost (i.e., the cost of the arc incident with the leaf) and the remaining nonseparable costs the size of ~((0, I))+a(( 1,2)) is equally charged to all users in the standard tree enterprise. This completes the first case. Case 2: Suppose that the estate is large, i.e., E < CjEN dj -indl, or equivalently, (n -2)a((O, 1)) < 2a( ( 1,2) ). Creditor 1 receives x1 = idI, while each other creditor i E N\{ 1) receives the amount the size of xi = LX where id2 < M 6 d2 -id, is determined by the efficiency condition idl+(n-l)a=E. That is, according to the nucleolus concept, the least total costs c(N) is allocated in such a way that each leaf in the standard tree enterprise is charged its separable cost, node 1 is charged half of the cost of its connecting arc to the supplier, whereas the remaining costs the size of ia((O, 1)) + a(( 1,2)) is equally charged to all users in the standard tree enterprise, except for user 1. This completes the second case.
For the general treatment of the nucleolus for standard tree enterprises, we refer to [lo] . Let us conclude the paper with a remark concerning the possible representation of the cost savings game corresponding to a standard tree enterprise game as the zeronormalized version of some bankruptcy game. It is still an open problem to provide, if possible, necessary and sufficient conditions on the data of the standard tree enterprise in order to establish this (reversed) representation of standard tree enterprises versus bankruptcy ventures.
